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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JONATHON DANIEL ROJAS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45469
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-3803

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court denied Jonathon Daniel Rojas’ Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35)
motion for a reduction of sentence, even though Mr. Rojas requested a reduction of the fixed
term of his sentence so he could start programming earlier. On appeal, Mr. Rojas asserts the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion, in view of the new and
additional information presented with the motion on his desire to rehabilitate.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Rojas described the background of this case. (See R., pp.10305.) He stated he had been released on parole and began staying at a clean and sober housing
facility. (See R., p.103.) Mr. Rojas was on parole in Canyon County No. CR 2014-11025
(hereinafter, the Canyon County case), a felony domestic violence case.

(See R., p.118.)

Mr. Rojas wrote in the Rule 35 motion that he turned in a dirty urinalysis test a few weeks into
his release, and the sober housing facility asked him to leave for at least three days. (See
R., p.103.) Mr. Rojas asserted that, because he had no place to go and could have been seen as
absconding, the sober housing facility should have contacted the parole office to have them
decide what should be done. (See R., p.103.) He suggested that, if the sober housing facility had
contacted them or local officials, he could have spent the required three days in jail, rather than
on the streets.

(See R., p.104.)

However, Mr. Rojas also emphasized he was taking

responsibility for his own actions. (See R., p.104.)
Mr. Rojas stated he then lived for a while with his girlfriend at her parents’ house; after
her parents asked them to leave, they slept in their car or couch surfed. (See R., p.104.) He
stated that several weeks later, he “was driving by himself, when he failed to yield to a Garden
City Officer. There after a police chase ensued and defendant drove his truck through a chain
link fence.” (R., pp.104-05.) At the sentencing hearing, the State indicated Mr. Rojas had an
arrest warrant out for non-compliance with his parole, fled from law enforcement when they
tried to pull him over, drove at a high speed at an officer before swerving at the last moment,
came close to striking a pedestrian in a residential area, and drove through the fence before
officers stopped him with a PIT maneuver. (See Tr., p.4, L.20 – p.5, L.17.) Mr. Rojas wrote in
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the Rule 35 motion that he next tried to flee into a house, but the homeowner confronted him
with a baseball bat. (See R., p.105.) He was then arrested. (R., p.105.)
The State initially charged Mr. Rojas with one count of felony eluding a peace officer,
one count of felony assault on law enforcement personnel, one count of misdemeanor resisting
and/or obstructing an officer, and count of misdemeanor eluding a peace officer, and one count
of misdemeanor driving without privileges. (R., pp.42-44.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Mr. Rojas agreed to plead guilty to felony eluding, and the State agreed to dismiss the other four
charges. (See R., pp.47-60.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.3, L.24 – p.4, L.3.) Mr. Rojas recommended
the district court impose a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed. (Tr., p.7, Ls.8-16.)
His defense counsel explained, “the reason is that would allow him to immediately get into some
programming and rehabilitation programs. Anything over that, he’s going to just be doing some
dead time or idle time before programming is available to him . . . .” (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-15.) The
district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, to be served
concurrently with the sentence imposed in the Canyon County case.

(See R., pp.63-66.)

Mr. Rojas did not file an appeal from the district court’s sentencing decision. (See R., pp.2-6
(case summary).)
In his Rule 35 motion, filed pro se, Mr. Rojas requested the district court reduce the fixed
term of his sentence to one year, to be followed by an indeterminate term of four years. (See
R., pp.105, 107, 112.) He asserted the requested reduction of the fixed term would allow him to
immediately start programming and avoid “idle time” in prison. (See R., pp.106-07, 111-12.)
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Mr. Rojas expressed his concerns that, if he had to wait a year or more to be eligible for
programming under his original sentence, the programming would be less effective or in vain.
(See R., pp.107-09.) He stated, “I do not want to become by the means of idle time so inattentive
to rehabilitation and to the purpose [I] was [s]ent here for, and to my personal goals of life, a life
with meaning, a family, hope, yes with struggles, but tools to over come.” (R., p.108.) He gave
a “whole hearted” commitment as to his want and desire to change, and requested the aid of the
district court to reduce the fixed term of his sentence by one year, “allowing me to attend
programming now and not a year or two down the road.” (R., p.111.)
The district court subsequently issued an order denying the Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.11721.) The district court determined that, “[a]lthough the Court appreciates the Defendant’s desire
to participate in these rehabilitative programs and his independent strides to commit to his
sobriety, the Defendant has not alleged new facts or evidence sufficient to demonstrate leniency
may be appropriate.”

(R., p.119.)

The district court stated that, in reaching its original

sentencing decision, it had “evaluated Defendant’s underlying conduct in this case along with his
lengthy criminal history and prior attempts at rehabilitation and parole.” (R., p.120.)
Upon reconsideration of the above items, the district court determined Mr. Rojas’
possibility for rehabilitation was secondary to the interest in protecting society, considering his
prior criminal history and record of reoffending while on community supervision.

(See

R., p.120.) The district court determined that community supervision was not sufficient to
protect the public, because Mr. Rojas was on parole in the Canyon County case when the instant
offense occurred. (See R., p.120.) The district court ultimately determined “the protection of
society and punishment for his continued violations support . . . the two-year fixed sentence that
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allows additional incarceration before he is once-again eligible for parole,” and denied the Rule
35 motion. (R., p.120.)
Mr. Rojas filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order Denying
Rule 35 Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence. (R., pp.122-27; see R., pp.133-35 (Amended
Notice of Appeal).)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Rojas’ Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence, in light of the new and additional information presented in
support of the motion on his desire to rehabilitate?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Rojas’ Idaho Criminal Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence, In View Of The New And Additional Information
Presented With The Motion On His Desire To Rehabilitate
Mr. Rojas asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence, in view of the new and additional information presented with
the motion on his desire to rehabilitate.
“A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.”

State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253

(Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). “The denial of a motion for modification of a sentence will
not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.” Id. “The criteria for
examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining
whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when
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pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction.” Id.
Mr. Rojas asserts his underlying sentence is excessive in view of the new and additional
information presented with the Rule 35 motion on his desire to rehabilitate. At the sentencing
hearing, Mr. Rojas’ counsel asserted that a sentence with a one-year fixed term would allow
Mr. Rojas to immediately get into programming and rehabilitation programs. (See Tr., p.7,
Ls.11-12.) Mr. Rojas told the district court that his girlfriend was due to give birth shortly after
his sentencing, and requested “a chance to get rehabilitated so I can make it back out to my
family and little ones as soon as possible.” (See Tr., p.8, Ls.7-14.)
In the Rule 35 motion, Mr. Rojas provided more details on his desire to rehabilitate. He
expressed his concerns that programming would be less effective, or even in vain, if he had to
wait a year or more to begin. Mr. Rojas indicated he wanted the requested modification to get
“meaningful programming,” and he needed the “tools to change his life without delay and idle
prison time, which becomes dangerous to anyone really seeking self change.” (See R., p.105.)
He worried that, without assistance, his idle time would only lead to failure. (See R., p.106.)
Mr. Rojas requested the opportunity to attend programming immediately and give true meaning
to life through rehabilitation, “without the threat of idle time chipping away as to form immunity
to any serious rehabilitation.” (See R., p.106.) He suggested that, without a reduction of
sentence, he would lose hope “and [i]dle time would win out and in short take over my life.”
(See R., p.107.) He did not want “to become by the means of idle time so inattentive to
rehabilitation and to the purpose [I] was [s]ent here for, and to my own personal goals of life, a
life with meaning, a family, hope, yes with struggles, but tools to over come.” (R., p.108.)
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Mr. Rojas also described his commitment to change. He indicated that he had taken
ownership of his faults, and like anyone else injured mentally or physically, he was seeking out
immediate treatment. (See R., p.106.) Mr. Rojas stated, “I seek honest and true transformation
from my old ways that have achieved nothing more than harm to myself, and society, to say
nothing of both listed and unlisted victims.” (R., p.106.) He had “100% enthusiasm to seek out
absolute change in every appropriate rehabilitation program, if allowed to attend with the
assistance of this court.” (R., p.109.) Further, Mr. Rojas stated he gave his “whole hearted . . .
commitment as my testament of change or the want and desire to change . . . .” (R., p.111.)
With the aid of the district court by reducing the fixed term of his sentence by one year,
Mr. Rojas would be allowed “to attend programming now and not a year or two down the road.”
(See R., p.111.)
Thus, Mr. Rojas asserts his underlying sentence is excessive in view of the above new
and additional information presented with the Rule 35 motion on his desire to rehabilitate. The
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion. The district court should
have instead granted Mr. Rojas’ Rule 35 motion, and reduced his sentence to a unified sentence
of five years, with one year fixed.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Rojas respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence
as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 28th day of February, 2018.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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